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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S'rATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Hl~GH LEOXARD vVOOD, alias 
Joseph Earl ~Iartin, alias Joseph 
Paul :Martin, alias James Walton, 
Defendant and Appella.nt. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 8020 
STATE.\IENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged by the State of Utah with 
the crimes of Grand Larceny and Being an Habitual 
Criminal, the charges being that he, Hugh Leonard Wood, 
on or about the 29th day of September, 1952, at the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, stole from Heusted 
and Montague, a Corporation, personal property having 
a value in excess of $50.00, lawful money of the United 
States; and that said Hugh Leonard Wood has been 
previously eonvicted of four felonies prior to the 29th 
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2 
day of September, 1952, as follows, to-wit: Burglary in 
the Htate of Oregon, where he was sentenced and com-
mitted for 3 years in the Oregon State Penitentiary; 
Burglary in the First Degree in the State of ~evada, ,. 
where he waH sentenced and committed for 1 to 10 years 
in the ~ evada State Penitentiary; Burglary in the First 
Degree and Prior Conviction in the State of California, 
where he was sentenced and eommitted for 5 years to 
life in the California State Prison; Burglary in the 
Seeond Degree and Persistent Offender in the State of 
Idaho, where he was sentenced and committed for 20 
years in the Idaho State Prison. 
The appellant was arrested at about noon on the 2nd 
day of October, 1952, as he was helping load a footlocker 
into a taxicab at the loading entrance to the 'Vilcox 
Hotel in Ogden, Utah by detectives Reeder and Butcher; 
questioning the taxi driver they learned that there were 
t\\·o more footlockers upstairs in room X o. 8, which 
Butcher and the taxi driver went up and brought down, 
officer Butcher asked the appellant what he was doing 
\Yith them and ·appellant stated that he was taking them 
to the depot at the request of James O'Neil, an old time 
acquaintance, who had requested his baggage, consisting 
of three footlockers in room 8 at the said Hotel be 
delivered at the depot for shipping. Officer Butcher 
claimed that appellant said that the footlocker which 
he was helping load into the taxicab belonged to him, 
which appellant denied at the trial. The Officers asked 
appellant what was in the footlocker, and he said he did 
f,,.,, 
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3 
not know. The officer::-; then told appellant that he was 
under arre::-;t, he asked what for, and they told hirn 
.. possession of stolen property." 
That appellant wa::-; registered at the \Vilcox Hotel, 
~-1'10 l(iet'el ~-\xenue, Ogden, Utah and occupied roorn 
number one at tirne of his arrest and had occupied said 
roorn for the entire uwnth previous to his arrest, that he 
never occupied room nurnber 8 at the Hotel and that he 
neYer had any of his belongings in room 8 at the Hotel. 
The ~tate clairned that the three footlockers taken 
frorn the \Yilcox Hotel contained clothing alleged to have 
been stolen frorn Heusted and :Montague at Salt Lake 
City, rtah on or about September 29, 1952. The only 
evidence produced at the trial was that appellant had 
rnomentary possession of a footlocker while assisting 
cab driver take said footlocker from the Wilcox Hotel to 
his cab at the rear of the Hotel, which the State claimed 
contained clothing alleged to have been stolen fron1 
Heusted and l\Iontague at Salt Lake City. No evidence 
was adduced hy the State to prove that appellant ever 
had any footlocker or any stolen property in his posses-
sion at the Hotel or any other place, excepting as stated, 
assisting the cab driver, and appellant denied that he 
ever had any footlocker in his possession, except as 
stated above, and no eYidenee was adduced to show that 
appellant ever knew what was in the footlocker which he 
assisted the taxi driYer take to his cab. 
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No evidence was given by State at the trial to prove 
that appellant was in Salt Lake City on September 29, 
1952 and appellant testified that he was not there at 
that time and that he had not been there for more than 
six months prior to that time, that he did not steal the 
property as alleged in the Information and that he did 
not have anything to do in stealing said property, and 
that he did not know what the footlocker contained which 
he assisted taxi driver deliver to his cab. 
Appellant contends that considering all the evidence 
adduced by the State at the trial, that if appellant should 
have been tried on any charge, he should have been tried 
for the crime of possession of stolen property in the 
District Court of Weber County, Utah. 
Appellant and l\Ierl Gall were charged with the crime 
of Grand Larceny in a complaint filed in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City the first part of October, 1952 and 
during that month the Grand Larceny complaint was 
dismissed and another complaint was filed in the City 
Court of Salt Lake City charging appellant with the 
crimes of Grand Larceny and Being an Habitual Crimi-
nal, charging appellant with having been previously con-
victed of four felonies as alleged in the Information. 
(R. Tr. 37-121) 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The following is a statement of the errors upon 
which the appellant relies for a reversal of the judgments 
in this case : 
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I 
'rhe court erred in denying appellant's n10tion to 
quash the Infonnation upon the following grounds: 
(1) That it does not charge the defendant with 
the comn1ission of an offense. 
(2) That the committing magistrate in this cause 
did not find that the crimes alleged in the Infornmtion 
were ever conuuitted by the defendant for the reason 
that no order \Va8 n1ade and signed by him requiring the 
defendant to answer in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of rtah to the offenses contained in the 
Infonnation. 
( 3) That the court trying the cause has no juris-
diction of the offenses charged or of the person of the 
defendant. 
( 4) That Inore than one offense is charged in the 
Information in a manner contrary to the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
II 
The court erred in refusing to grant appellant a 
:\Iistrial when during the course of his trial for Grand 
Larceny the District Attorney over objections of appel-
lant was permitted to cross-examine him on alleged 
felonies contained in the Information wherein appellant 
was charged with the crime of Being an Habitual 
Criminal. 
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III 
( 1) The court erred in not .sustaining appellant's 
motion for dismissal of the action made at the time 
the State rested its case on the trial for Grand Larceny. 
The motion was made on the grounds of insufficiency of 
the evidence introduced by the State and failure of proof 
of the allegations contained in the Information. 
(:2) The court erred in denying the appellant's 
nwtion made at the conclusion of the trial on charge 
of Grand Larceny, that the court direct the jury trying 
the case to return a verdict of not guilty, for the reason 
and upon the grounds that no testimony or evidence was 
introduced to prove that appellant did steal, take and 
carry any property frmn He us ted and :Jf ontague at Salt 
Lake Count~·, l~tah; and for the further reason that if 
the claim that possession of recently stolen property 
is considered as evidence in this case, then the appellant 
contends that a sufficient and proper explanation was 
made of that, so that there "·as no evidencB introduced 
in this case to prove appellant guilty of Grand Larceny 
as charged in the Information. The appellant claiming 
that the State had not introduced sufficient evidence to 
justify the court in sub1nitting the case to the jury. 
IV 
Utah's Habitual Criminal Act, Section 76-1-18 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, is unconstitutional and void as 
written, construed and applied; being in violation of and 
denying appellant's Federal Constitutional right to "Due 
r 
l 
J 
l 
~ 
1 
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Proet>~~ of Law" as guaranteed by laws and Constitution 
of the ~tate of Utah and under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. 
The ~aid Habitual Cri1ninal Statute reads as follows: 
.. \Yhoever has been previously twice -convicted of felonies, 
sentenced and connnitted to any prison, shall, upon con-
viction of a felony con1n1itted in this state, ..... be 
deemed to be an habitual crin1inal, and shall be punished 
by imprison1nent in the state prison for not less than 
fifteen years. '' 
The said Habitual Crin1inal Act is unconstitutional 
and void as applied in this case when appellant was 
prosecuted for crin1es alleged to have been committed in 
~-Hates other than Utah. 
The Information and judgment 1n this case shows 
that appellant was prosecuted, tried and convicted and 
sentenced under the said Utah's Habitual Criminal 
Statute on charges of four alleged previous convictions 
of purported "felonies" in other states of Oregon, Cali-
fornia, Nevada and Idaho. 
Prior to 1951 the Habitual Criminal Statute, Section 
103-1-18, Utah Code 1943 used the word "crime" which 
has a universal legal 1neaning; but the new statute as 
revised and re-enacted by Chapter 77 Laws of Utah 1951 
used the purely local statutory term "felonies," which 
in lTtah as defined h~' statute Utah Code 1953, "A felony 
is a crime which is or may be punishable with death, or 
h~' impriRomnent in the state prison." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under our statutory system of law, there is no such 
thing as a universal com1non law felony, in these United 
States, the word felony has no legal meaning; therefore 
in each and every State its local legal meaning is defined 
in various ways by State statutes, and applied in varying 
degrees, only to classify those crimes committed within 
each State's own Jurisdiction and Borders. And like any 
other State statutory creation, has no extraterritorial 
force, meaning or effect in other States, or on any acts 
committed beyond its borders. 
Any alleged offense to be a felony under any Utah 
Statute 1nust be a crime within the borders and juris-
diction of, under and against the laws of Utah; any 
alleged previous offenses of whatever local name, in 
other States and other jurisdictions do not qualify as 
felonies under any law of the State of Utah. 
v 
The court erred in permitting District Attorney 
over objections of appellant to force appellant to testify 
against himself and to incriminate himself and to furnish 
the evidence to convict himself on the untried charge of 
Being an Habitual Crinrinal while he was on trial for 
Grand Larceny which is contrary to and in violation of 
the Habitual Criminal Statute of the State of Utah. 
VI 
The court erred in denying appellant's Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment filed and argued in this cause before 
sentence was passed upon him for the verdicts of the 
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jury upon grounds at' t'tated in said motion, some of the 
grounds being, that the court did not have jurisdiction 
of the offenses charged in the Inforn1·ation or jurisdiction 
of the person of the appellant; that appellant was denied 
a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States and the Statutes of the State of Utah for 
the reason that he was tried and convicted upon four 
alleged and purported felonies in said trial upon which 
he had theretofore been found guilty and punished as 
provided by law in each of s'aid cases, therefore appellant 
was compelled to suffer double jeopardy in said cases 
which is contrary to the Statutes of the State of Utah. 
VII 
The court erred in denying appellant's Motion for 
a New Tri'al made upon the grounds of insufficiency of 
the evidence adduced by the State to support the verdict 
of the jury; and also upon the grounds of errors made 
by the court in its instructions to the jury, and errors 
made by the court in decisions of questions of law during 
the course of the trial and for acts done and allowed by 
the court during the course of the trial prejudicialto the 
substantial rights of appellant. 
VIII 
The court erred in ignoring and refusing to make 
any pronouncmnent or to enter judgment against appel-
lant for the cri1ne of Grand Larceny or to sentence him 
for the rrime of Grand Larceny after the jury returned 
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a verdict against appellant of guilty of Grand Larceny, 
before he ~sentenced him for the crime of Being An 
Habitual Criminal. 
PARTICULAR QUESTIONf; INVOLVED 
They are as above-stated in the Statement of Errors. 
ARGU~lENT 
POINT KU~IBER I 
The defendant filed his ~lotion to Quash the Infor-
mation in this cause before he had entered his plea to 
the Infonnation in the District Court ,,·hich was argued 
and by the court denied on January 10, 1953 (Tr. 12). 
The court erred in denying defendant'·s motion to quash 
on the grounds that the Information did not charge him 
with the commission of an offense. The Information did 
not allege ownership of property alleged to have been 
stolen. In State vs. Jensen, 83 Utah 452, 30 P. 2d 203, 
the Court held that "Information which did not allege 
ownership of property taken is fatally defective, since 
it was necessary in order to charge crime of Larceny to 
allege that property belonged to some one other than 
defendant. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion to j 
quash on grounds that committing magistrate did not 
find that the crimes alleged in the Information were ever 
committed by defendant for the reason that no order was 1 1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to 
to 
not 
rer 
11 
made and signed h~, him requiring defendant to answer 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
to the offen8e8 contained in the Information. 
Section 77-15-19, Ftah Code 1953, District court 
doe~ not require jurisdiction over defendant as a result 
of original cmnplaint, but rather from the binding over 
of defendant by nmgistrate. 
State u-:. Freema,n, 93 Utah 125, 71 P. 2d 196. 
That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction 
of the offenses charged or of the person of the defendant. 
That n1ore than one offense is charged in the Infor-
mation in a 1nanner contrary to the laws of the State of 
Utah (R. Tr. 12). 
The last two statmnent~ are argued elsewhere 1n 
this Brief. 
POINT NU1fBER II 
The court erred in refusing to grant appellant a 
:Jlistrial when during the course of his trial for Grand 
Larceny the District Attorney over objections of appel-
lant was per1nitted by the court to cross-examine him on 
alleged felonies which he was alleged to have committed 
and which were contained in the Information, being the 
charges filed against appellant in the Infonnation charg-
ing hiu1 with BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL (Tr. 
123). 
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The conduct of the District Attorney was in total 
di'sregard of the rights of appellant on trial of the crimes 
of Grand Larceny and Being an Habitual Criminal and 
in direct violation of the laws of Utah in Criminal Pro-
cedure in trials of criminal cases and in direct violation 
of Section 76-1-19, Utah Code 1953, Procedure in charg-
ing and trying a person <·barged with being an habitual 
criminal .... the jury shall not be told of the previous 
convictions of felony and the trial on the felony com-
mitted within the State of rtah shall proceed as in other 
cases. 
The jury was so prejudiced by the District Attorney 
showing that appellant was guilty of Being an Habitual 
Criminal \\'hile on trial on the untried charge of Grand 
Larceny that they could not give appellant a fair trial 
for the crime of Grand Larceny for which he was on trial 
at that time. 
The court erred in pennitting District Attorney over 
objections of appellant to force appellant to testify 
against himself, and to incriminate himself, and to con-
vict himself on the untried crime of Being an Habitual 
Criminal while he was on trial for the crime of Grand 
Larceny, which is in violation of the laws of the State 
of Utah and the Habitual Criminal Statute of Utah (R. 
Tr. 121-139). 
j 
I 
I 
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POINT NUnfBER III 
The n1otions made hy appellant for dismissal of the 
action for Grand Larceny when the State rested its case 
and that the court direct the jury to return a verdict of 
not guilty of Grand Larceny at the eonelusion of the 
trial, are being grouped a:-:; practically the same errors 
are complained of in both of the 1notions t'ta ted in State-
ment of Errors Xun1ber III. 
'Yhen the State rested its case for Grand Larceny, 
appellant nwved the court for a dismissal of the action 
upon the grounds that the evidence adduced by the State 
was in~ufficient to prove that the crime of Grand Lar-
ceny had been cominitted by appellant as alleged in the 
Infonnation and Bill of Particulars filed in thi~s action. 
The State had not proved that appellant on or about 
September 29, 1952 at Salt Lake County, Utah, did steal, 
take and carry awa~T frorn Heusted and Montague per-
sonal vroperty having a value in excess of $50. 
The court erred in denying appellant's motion for 
dismissal of the action. 
( \Yhere referring to Reporter's Transcript we have 
called the same "R. Tr." and refer to rest of file as "Tr.") 
There was an absolute "failure of proof" by the 
State to connect appellant in any way with the alleged 
larcen~T as stated in Information. No evidence was intro-
duced at the trial to show that appellant was in Salt 
Lake County at time alleged in the Information- and 
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14 
appellant testified at trial that he was not in Salt Lake 
Count~· at time alleged and that he had not been in Salt 
Lake Count~· for more than ~ix months previous to that 
time. 
It wa:-; held in <·a:-:<' of State v. Wh itt'l.IJ, 100 Utah 
1-l-, 110 P. 2d :~:17 that in all cases where the presence of 
the aeeused i~ nece:-;sar~· to render him responsible, the 
:-:tate mu:-~t proYe a:-: a part of its case that he was there, 
and if from all the evidence there exists a reasonable 
doubt of accused's pre~ence, he should be acquitted. 
All the evidence produced at the trial against appel-
lant was that he had m01nentary possession in assisting 
cab driver take a footlocker down stairs at the \Yilcox 
Hotel, Ogden, T~tah, which State claimed contained some 
stolen clothing. Appellant stated that he did not know 
what the footlocker contained - no evidence was pro-
duced to prove that appellant knew the footlocker con-
tained stolen property. Officers testified that they asked 
appellant who the footlocker belonged to, and they stated 
that he said it belonged to hiln, which he denied at the 
trial and he testified that he told officers he was taking 
footlocker to the train depot for James O'Neil who had 
occupied room nmnber 8 at the 'Vilcox Hotel, who had 
requested that he have it taken to the depot for him (R. 
Tr. 116, 117, 118). 
The officers informed appellant that he was under 
arrest, he asked 'dmt for, and they told him "possession 
of stolen property." 
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Appellant contend~ that if he was to be prosecuted 
and tried for an~· offense, it should have been for pos-
~e~~inn of ~tolen property, and should have been tried 
where found and arrested, in District Court of \Veber 
County, rtah. 
There never was a single hit of evidence produced 
to prove appellant guilty of Grand Larceny in Salt Lake 
County a~ alleged in the Information, but the State relied 
on that provision in the Larceny Statute to-wit: "pos-
~e~~ion of propert~· recently stolen, when the person in 
po~~e~sion faib to rnake a satisfactory explanation, shall 
he deemed prima facie evidence of guilt." 
Appellant eontends that that provi~ion of the larceny 
~tatute i~ uncon~titutional and void, for the reason that 
it compels the per~on on trial for larceny to prove his 
mnocence. 
The ~upreme Court of the United States rn 1933 
under the "Due Process of Law" elause of ~edion 1 of 
the 1-!th amendment to the Constitution of the t:"nited 
~tates held: That proof to an~· element of a crirninal 
eharge, or guilty knowledge thereof cannot be pre~umed 
and the burden of proof cannot be put upon the defend-
ant to di~prove any element of the crjme. Referring to 
ea~e of ill orrisson rs. California, 291 U. S. 82-90, 5-l- S. Ct. 
:2~1-:2~:1, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States 
held California's Alien Land Law to be unconstitutional. 
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The mere adrni~~ion by appellant that the footlocker 
belonged to him, which he was assisting cab driver take 
down ·stairs of Wilcox Hotel, would not, with the other 
evidence adduced at the trial support the conviction for 
Grand Larceny. State 1:s. Nichols, lOG Utah 104, 145 P. 
2d 802. 
Possession of goods recently stolen in connection 
with burglar~· doe~ not in itself create a presumption, or 
amount to prirna facie proof, that the possesser is guilty 
of burglary. After proof that defendant in a prosecution 
for burglary accompanied by theft has possession of 
stolen goods soon after the crime, he is not required to 
show that he obtained the goods "fairly and honestly," 
but if explanation is required it need go no further than 
to show that possession wa8 not acquired through com-
plicity in the particular crime of which defendant is 
accused. 
As the burden of proof in a criminal case can never 
shift, an instruction tlra t the showing of a specific fact 
is prima facie evidence of guilt, or raises a presumption 
of guilt, is inaccurate, as leading the jury to think that 
proof of such a fact casts upon defendant the burden of 
proving his innocence. State vs. Brady, 91 N. \V. 801 
(Iowa 1902) 
The State did not supply evidence necessary to con-
nect appellant directly with the offense charged. 
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State rs. Ha.rcombe, 7S Utah 89, 158 P. 1096; 
State rs. Pomeroy, S3 l~tah 91, 38 P. 2d 751; 
State rs. Petit, 97 lTtah -t.-t.:~, 93 P. 2d 75. 
The State 1nust prove the ca~e and bear the "Burden 
of Proof" as to eYery e~:-;ential element of the crime 
throughout the trial. 
Sta.te r~"·· Jlaunion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 5-t-2: 
S'tate rs. J/ cCune, 1G rtah 170, 51 P. 818; 
,-.,'tate rs. TVlzitely, 100 l~tah 1-t, 110 P. 2d 337; 
Jlorrisson rs. California, 291 F. S. 82, 90, 54 S. 
Ct. 2S1, 2S7; 
State vs. Barretta, -!7lTtah 479, 155 P. 343. 
(R. Tr. 16-121.) 
POINT NlrJfBER lY 
The court erred in compelling appellant on go on 
trial on the charge of Being· an Habitual Criminal on 
tlw grounds that the said Habitual Criminal Act of 
lTtah is unconstitutional as \\Titten, construed and ap-
plied, being in violation of and denying appellant's Fed-
eral Constitutional right to ''Due Process of Law" by 
laws of Utah and the Constitution of the State of Utah 
In· and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the l T nited States Section one. 
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ThP ::mid Habitual Criminal Statute reads as fol-
lows: '' \Vhoever ha~ bePn previous}~' twice convicted 
of felonie~, sentenced and committed to any prison, shall, 
upon convi<'tiou of a felony committed in this State ... 
lw deemed to 1 H • "\ 11 Habitual Criminal and shall be pun-
Ished h~, iutpri:-;onln<>nt in the State Prison for a term not 
less tlwn fifteen years.'' 
r:rhe Information and judgment in this case shows 
that appellant was prosecuted, tried and convicted and 
sentenced under the said Utah's Hahitual Criminal Stat-
ute for the offenses of four alleged previous convictions 
of purported ''felonies'' in other states of Oregon, 
California, X evacla and Idaho. 
Appellant contends that this Utah Statute does not 
In any way include any such alleged previous convic-
tions of crimes in other states within its provisions but 
is restricted as a matter of law to previous convictions 
of felonies in the State of l'tah. 
The said Habitual Criminal Statute is unconstitu-
tional and void as applied in this case when appellant 
was prosecuted for crimes alleged to have been com-
mitted in States other than Utah. 
Although such previous convictions may have been 
included in Utah's former 1-Iabitual Criminal Law, Utah 
Code 1943 Section 103-1-18 because it read as far as 
pertinent here as follows: '' \Vhoever has been pre-
vious}~· twice convicted of crime, sentenced and com-
rnitted to prison, in this or any other state, for terms of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I , 
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not le::-s than three years each, shall, upon conviction of 
a felony committed in this state be deemed to be an 
habitual criminal.'' But in 1951 the Legislature struck 
out and abolished these provisions as to Crime and 
Any Other State, completely from the 1943 Habitual 
Criminal Statute and restricted the terms of Utah's 
Habitual Crin1inal Statute to previous convictions of 
felonie::- in the State of Utah. 
Boyd Y~. Smyth, 200 Iowa 687, 205 N.W. 522, 
43A.L.R. 137. Defendant in this case was tried 
for receiving stolen property, the Supreme Court 
in that case held: "It is settled law that, where 
statutes are revised and some parts of the origi-
nal are omitted, the parts omitted cannot be re-
Yived b~- construction hut are considered an-
nulled.'' 36 C:·c. 1080. 
Prior to 1951 the Habitual Criminal Statute used the 
,,·ord •' Crime'' which has a universal legal meaning, 
hut our present statute as revised and re-enacted by 
Chapter 77 Laws of Utah 1951 uses the purely local 
statutory term "felonies". Under our statutory system 
of law, there is no such thing as a universal common-
law felon~-, which when it existed was an offense punish-
able by death. In these United Ntates the word "felony" 
has no legal meaning; therefore in each and every state 
it~ local legal meaning is defined in various ways by 
state ~tatutes onl~T to classify those crimes committed 
within each State's own jurisdiction and borders, and 
like any other State Statutory creation, has no extra-
territorial force, meaning or effect in Other States, or 
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on any acts committed beyond its borders. Therefore, 
any alleg<>u offense, in order to be a ''felony'' under 
any Utah Htatute, must be a crime within the borders 
and jurisdiction of, under and against the laws of Utah; 
and any alleged previous offense, of whatever local 
name, in Other Htatt-~ and jurisdictions, do not qualify 
as felonie8 under any law of the State of Utah. 
In the instant case, the Supreme Courts of each of 
the States in whieh the alleged previous convictions oc-
curred, Hold that their Statutory "Felony" has no 
meaning beyond their borders and jurisdiction. 
In re Biggs, 52 Oregon 433, 97 P. 713. In 
the absence of statute the term ''felony'' is not 
descriptiYe of any offense. 
In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452, 
which cite California and Nevada cases: In re 
Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P.2d 166. 
Appellant subn1its that these decisions of other 
states are binding on their statutes. 
It n1ust be presumed that the Legislature meant to 
change the Statute as it did, so that it novY applies only 
to persons previously convicted of crimes termed 
''felonies'' committed in and punishable in the State 
of Utah. 
If any Statute of any jurisdiction is meant to in-
clude any act in any of the Other States of the United 
States within its terms, it must, in exact words, use the 
I 
I 
j 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
classical definition - ''Any Other State'' or any of 
The State~ to include them, for otherwise, as here, the 
~ta tute excludes them. 
Twin Falls vs. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 156 
P.:2d 319, 66 S.Ct.444. The classical designation 
to clearly indicate the ~tates as individual gov-
erninental entities 1naking up the United States 
dating from the Constitution and coming down 
through various Acts of Congress and pronounce-
nlent:s of the courts i~ the word '':-·Hates''. 
A penal Statute can reach no further than 
ib word~, no person can be made subject to them 
by implication. 
Appellant submits that it is necessary under the 
well established principle of Criminal Law, that any 
Statute must ~tate in direct words all that its terms 
are meant to include, or be held Unconstitutional for 
lack of ''X otice'' under the Due Process of Law clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. 
In Conclusion, appellant submits that the alleged 
previous conYictions of a number of purported '' felo-
nies" in Other State:-;, are not within either the words 
or legal meaning of Utah's Habitual Criminal Statute 
and that a~ arbitrarily construed and applied again~t 
the appellant by the State to convict and punish him 
under it, that it violate~ in toto Federal Constitutional 
1
m· Rigltb; to lawful "Notice" and to "Due Process of 
it~ Law"; and that thP said Habitual Criminal Statute hy 
&1 being ~o construed and applied is thereby ]aeking in law-
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ful "~ otice" a:-; written and 1~ Unconstitutional, Null 
and void undPr the Law~ and Constitution of the State 
ol' l !tah and tlw ''DUE PROCESS OF.., LAW" clause 
of St>('tion One of tlH' Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and it should be so 
Declared. 
POINT NUMBER V 
The court erred in permitting District Attorney over 
objections of appellant to force appellant to testify 
again:-;t himself and to incriminate himself and to fur-
nish the evidence to convict himself on the untried case 
of Being An Habitual Criminal while he was on trial 
for Grand Larceny which i:::; contrary to and in viola-
tion of the Habitual Criminal Statute of the State of 
Utah. 
As far as pertinent here, the Habitual Criminal 
Statute is as follows: ''The jury shall not be told of 
the previous convictions of felony and the trial on the 
felony committed within the State of Utah shall preceed 
a:-; in other cases". 
X ot only did this action of the State deprive appel-
lant of his Constitutional right to a trial by a fair and im-
partial jury, Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 12 
and Utah Code 1953 Section 77-1-8, but it also forced 
appellant to testify against himself and furnish the 
evidence against himself to convict him of the crime 
of Being An Habitual Criminal before the jury· on the 
I ~1 
'
,, 
I 
'[1 
an 
I'R 
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''"a~ on trial I'Pr (;rand Larceny. It cannot be contended 
that it wa~ eross-examination on the charge of Being 
An Habitual Cri1ninal for the reason that appellant 
was at that ti1ne on trial for Grand Larceny. (Tr. 
1:21-143). 
POINT ~U:MBER YI 
The court erred in denying appellant's l\Iotion in 
~-\._rrest of J udg1nent filed and argued in this cause be-
fore ~entence \Yas passed or judgment entered against 
appellant for the verdicts of the jury upon grounds 
as stated in said motion, some of the grounds being, 
that the court did not have jurisdiction of the offenses 
charged in the Information or jurisdiction of the per-
son of the appellant; that appellant \Hls denied a fair 
trial as guaranteed h~~ the Constitution of the United 
~ Statt>::; Fourteenth Amendment Section one, Constitu-
~: tion of Utah, Article 1, Section 12 and Utah Code 1953 
Section 77-1-8. And further that appellant was tried 
and convicted upon four alleged and purported felonies 
in ~aid trial upon which he had theretofore been found 
g-uiltr and puni~d1Pd as provided by law in eaeh of said 
case;;;, therefore appellant was compelled to suffer dou-
ble jeopardy in said cases which is eontrary to the 
Statntp:-; of the State of Utah. (R. Tr. 191-192) 
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POINT NUMBER VII 
rrhe court erred in denying appellant'~ 2\Iotion for 
a New Trial nmde upon the grounds of insufficiency of 
the evidence introduced by the State to support the 
verdict of thP jury; and also upon the grounds of errors 
made by the court in its instructions to the .jury, and 
errors made by the court in decisions of questions of 
la ,,,, during the course of the trial and for acts done 
and allowed by the court during the trial prejudicial 
to the substantial righb of appellant. (R. Tr. 189) 
On the Point of insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict of the jury, appellant refers to 
his arguments in Point Xumber III to support his argu-
ment on that Point. 
~\ppellant excepted to court 'i' instruction two and 
seven for the trial of Grand Larceny (R. Tr. 141), the 
said instructions were prejudicial to appellant's rights 
to a fair trial. Appellant especially objects to that part 
of Instruction Number two, as follows: "That there-
after the defendant \Yas found in possession of the re-
cently stolen goods and if you also find that the defend-
ant failed to give a satisfactory explanation of his pos-
session, there would arise an inference that the defend-
ant conm1itted the larceny himself." (R. Tr. 171, 172) 
Appellant contends that instruction as given 
by the court was just the same as if the court had 
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty of 
Grand Larceny. 
tri 
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A~ to error~ committed h~· the court of questions 
of law during trial and for art~ done and allowed by 
the court during trial prejudicial to the substantial 
rights of appellant, appellant refers to his argument 
under Point~ II and Y to ~npport his argument on 
those points. (R. Tr. 121-143). 
POINT NU~lBER YIII 
The eourt erred in the matter of not entering judg-
ment against appellant and senteneing him for the crime 
of grand larcen~· after the jury returned a verdict of 
t,'liilty of Grand Larceny before he ~entenced appellant 
for the crin1e of Being An Habitual Criminal. 
It requires no quotation of authority to state with-
out contradiction that no person can be punished and 
imprisoned except a~ provided by statute in the State 
of Utah. 
lJ tah 's Habitual Criminal Statute provides that be-
fore a person can be found guilty of Being An Habitual 
Criminal he must be convicted of a felony committed in 
this state. ~\ppellant conten<1~ that the said conviction 
for Grand Larceny was not complete until judgment had 
been entered and appellant had been :-;entenced for the 
crime of grand larceny. (R. rrr. 197) 
Appellant further contend~ that the judgment entered 
111 this cause against appellant l'or having been found 
guilty of the crime of Being· .\n Habitual Criminal and 
the sentence given that appellant serYP fifteen years in 
the StatP Prison for said crime are null and void for 
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the reason that they are not based upon law and that 
they should be i'Pi aside and the appellant discharged. 
The trial court showed that it rejected and refused 
to consider the verdict of the jury which found appel-
lant guilty of the erime of Grand Larceny when the 
court dn·w a line through the words ''Grand Larceny'' 
contained in Certificate of Probable Cause and scratched 
those words out of said Certificate together with the 
letter "s" in word t-rimes contained in the said Cer-
tificate filed in this cause. (Tr. 199) 
Front a consideration of the entire proceedings, it 
1s n1anifest, I submit that the trial court erred in the 
respects herein pointed out and that the judgments of 
conviction should be reversed, and the case remanded 
to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the case 
and discharge the appellant. 
Respectfully submittea, 
R. R. HACKETT, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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